Unstructured oral negotiations are not a practical way to resolve disputes between countries when there is no fundamental agreement on the main issues. This is clearly illustrated by the RF/Ukraine negotiations in Istanbul. They could agree issues on prisoner exchange because it is a non-controversial issue. But still no hope for a peace agreement.
When such situation arises then exchange of written representations is the appropriate procedure. One party sends to the other a written request of its demands with clearly stated reasons. The other either accepts or rejects (totally or partially or conditionally) each demand with clear reasons and. if needed, sends its own counter-demands in the same form.
Such exchange of written representations will either result in full or partial agreement, or will prove that no agreement can be achieved. It will also show who is right and who is wrong.
Below follows an example of such written representation based on the Memorandum presented to Ukraine by the Russian Federation and Zelensky's public statements:
| Request by the Government of the Russian Federation to the Government of Ukraine | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Filled by the Russian Federation | Filled by the Government of Ukraine | Filled by an impartial legal authority | |||||
| No. | Request | Reason | Response | Reason | Decision | Reason | |
| 1 | a | International legal recognition of the inclusion of Crimea, | Crimea joined the Russian Federation in 2014 by a referendum decision of 96.7% in favour, with a 83.1% turnout. It never had a Ukrainian majority population, and had native Russian majority after being conquered by Russia from Crimean Tatars in 1783. | Reject. | According to the Constitution of Ukraine Crimea is part of Ukraine. | RF request is valid. | Ukraine's reason for rejection is invalid because a country's constitution is applicable only within the country itself and has no effect on other countries. |
| b | LPR, | Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics are located in the historical Russian region of Donbas, which was added to Ukraine by the USSR in 1922. The majority of the population speaks Russian as their first language. Attempts by various Ukrainian governments to question the legitimacy of the Russian culture in Ukraine had since the Declaration of Independence of Ukraine often resulted in political conflict. In April 2014 the Luhansk People's Republic proclaimed independence from Ukraine, which was confirmed by a referendum held on 11 May 2014. The vote was 96.2% for independence, 3.8% against. In 2022 the LPR joined the Russian Federation. | Reject. | According to the Constitution of Ukraine Luhansk is part of Ukraine. | RF request is valid. | Ukraine's reason for rejection is invalid because a country's constitution is applicable only within the country itself and has no effect on other countries. | |
| c | DPR, | Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics are located in the historical Russian region of Donbas, which was added to Ukraine by the USSR in 1922. The majority of the population speaks Russian as their first language. Attempts by various Ukrainian governments to question the legitimacy of the Russian culture in Ukraine had since the Declaration of Independence of Ukraine often resulted in political conflict. In April 2014 the Donetsk People's Republic proclaimed independence from Ukraine, which was confirmed by a referendum held on 11 May 2014. The vote was 89% for independence, 10% against. In 2022 the DPR joined the Russian Federation. | Reject. | According to the Constitution of Ukraine Donetsk is part of Ukraine. | RF request is valid. | Ukraine's reason for rejection is invalid because a country's constitution is applicable only within the country itself and has no effect on other countries. | |
| d | Zaporozhye, | Zaporozhye was founded by Russia in 1770, when the Aleksandrovskaya Fortress was built as a part of the Dnieper Defence Line, to protect the southern territories of the Russian Empire from Crimean Tatar invasions. On 28 September Zaporozhye became part of the Russian Federation following a referendum in which 93.11% voted in favour of this. | Reject. | According to the Constitution of Ukraine Zaporozhye is part of Ukraine. | RF request is valid. | Ukraine's reason for rejection is invalid because a country's constitution is applicable only within the country itself and has no effect on other countries. | |
| e | and Kherson | The Russian Empire annexed the territory from the Crimean Khanate in 1774. In 1922 the region was formally incorporated into the UkSSR, a constituent republic of the USSR. In 2022, following a referendum held in the Russian held part of the region, that part became an independent state, and then joined the Russian Federation. | Reject. | According to the Constitution of Ukraine Kherson is part of Ukraine. | RF request is valid. | Ukraine's reason for rejection is invalid because a country's constitution is applicable only within the country itself and has no effect on other countries. | |
| f | into the Russian Federation; | All these areas were part of Russia since 1780s or earlier. LPR, DPR, Zaporozhye and Kherson were transferred to UkSSR in 1922 and Crimea in 1954 by the USSR government. In 1991 UkSSR became independent Ukraine, but as long as it had normal relations with the Russian Federation there was no conflict between the Ukrainian government and the native Russian population of Ukraine. Following the pro-Western regime-change in 2014, hostilities developed between the Ukrainian nationalist government and the Russian populations of these areas. This has resulted in separation of these areas from Ukraine and their joining the Russian Federation. The right of the populations of these areas to chose to be part of the Russian Federation needs to be recognised as the right to self-determination to which they are entitled in the same way as Ukraine's right to self-determination was recognized in 1991 when it separated from the USSR. Attempts by Ukraine to force the Russian Federation from these areas is the main present material cause of this war. Formal legal recognition by Ukraine of these areas being part of the Russian Federation is the main condition for permanent peace between the RF and Ukraine. | Reject. | According to the Constitution of Ukraine these areas are part of Ukraine. | RF request is valid. | Ukraine's reason for rejection is invalid because a country's constitution is applicable only within the country itself and has no effect on other countries. | |
| g | full removal from the above areas of all the military forces of Ukraine. | Once Ukraine fully recognizes these areas being part of the Russian Federation, full removal of all the military forces of Ukraine from these areas will be the natural logical step of the implementation of the peace agreement. | Reject. | Because according to the Constitution of Ukraine these areas are part of Ukraine, Ukraine has full right to keep any military forces in these areas. For the same reason RF must remove all its military forces from these areas. | RF request is valid. | Ukraine's reason for rejection is invalid because according to points 1(a) to 1(f) above these areas are part of RF and Ukraine failed to provide valid reasons for rejecting the demands of the Russian Federation for all these areas. | |
| 2 | Neutrality of Ukraine: Ukraine shall not join any military alliance or coalition and shall not allow any military activities by third parties or presence of any foreign military bases or infrastructure on its territory. | Joining any military alliance of any form by either of the parties against the other would be breach of the peace agreement between the parties, because such step implies the party doing so becoming an enemy of the other party. | |||||
| 3 | Termination of all the present and refusal of all the future international agreements incompatible with item (2) above. | This condition follows logically from condition (2) above. | |||||
| 4 | Ukraine as a state shall be forbidden to possess nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and to have such weapons stationed on its territory or transported through it. | As there will be peace between the parties, there will be no need for Ukraine to have such weapons. But as the Russian Federation is a nuclear state, it should provide to Ukraine a guarantee that, if Ukraine is attacked by a nuclear third party, it will use its nuclear capability to protect Ukraine from nuclear attack. | |||||
| 5 | a | The size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and any other military formations, as well as of arms and military technology and their capabilities shall have established numeric limits; | Such limits need to be reasonable and the RF need to give to Ukraine guarantee that if Ukraine is attacked by a third party, the RF will provide to Ukraine military assistance to protect it from such aggression. | ||||
| b | all nationalist formations within the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the National Guard shall be disbanded. | There is no reason for existence of some special "nationalist formations" within the Ukrainian Armed Forces. | |||||
| 6 | a | The Russian and Russian speaking populations of Ukraine shall have full rights and freedoms | All Ukrainian citizens should have full civil rights and freedoms regardless of their ethnicity. And any linguistic minority should not be restricted from using their language, including teaching their language to their children. Any restrictions relating to Russian and Russian speaking citizens of Ukraine imposed on them due to the war and the martial law shall need to be removed once the peace treaty comes into force. | ||||
| b | and the Russian language shall have an official status. | According to the 2001 Ukrainian Census 29.59% of the Ukrainian population were native Russians, this justifies giving Russian an official status. | Reject | Native Russians are mostly concentrated in the areas presently held by the Russian Federation. This means that the proportion of native Russian speakers within Ukraine has significantly reduced to a level which does not justify an official status. | Ukrainian rejection is valid. | The reason for the rejection provided by Ukraine is valid. | |
| 7 | a | Glorification and propaganda of Nazism and Neo-Nazism shall be forbidden by law | "Nazism", here, implies a nationalist ideology militantly hostile to non-members of the "nation", similar to the German National Socialism of the times of Adolf Hitler, as it was common in some countries of Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, occupied by Germany in WW2. It is obvious that promotion of such ideologies in Ukraine shall be incompatible with permanent peace with the Russian Federation. But this should not be confused with peaceful Ukrainian nationalism. All nations have their own nationalisms, national pride, national sorrows, national heroes. And within the Russian Federation different nations have their local nationalisms and also the common Federal nationalism. The same applies to Ukraine. This needs to be acknowledged and respected, but not allowed to develop into hostilities. | b | and all nationalistic organizations and parties shall be disbanded. | For the difference between "Nazism" and "peaceful nationalism" see (7a) above. Like the Russian Federation, Ukraine is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious country, and to avoid ethnic conflicts both need to respect the multiple ethnicities and religions within their populations. | |
| 8 | Cancellation of all the present and non-introduction of any future economic sanctions or restrictive measures between the RF and Ukraine. | Sanctions are part of the war, and for permanent peace need to be removed. | |||||
| 9 | Resolution of all issues relating to re-unification of families and displaced persons. | Once the peace treaty comes into force, these issues will need to be resolved. | |||||
| 10 | Abandonment of all mutual claims related to damage caused by military actions. | Ukraine and its "western" backers have been promoting a narrative that Russia is an aggressor and Ukraine is the victim. This narrative is false, because this war is the result of the "western" powers having failed to end the Cold War after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, and continued with hostilities towards the Russian Federation. The 2014 regime-change in Ukraine is one of such hostile activities. Hostilities by the west-backed Ukrainian nationalist government towards everything Russian, including within its own population, had caused the ethnic conflict, which has led to the war. The Ukrainian government had many opportunities to prevent and, when started, to end this war, but they continued with their belligerence towards the RF. Much of the responsibility for this war lies with those "western players" who having created the conflict in the first place, pushed it towards the war and continued supporting this war and preventing its ending. Abandonment of all mutual claims is the simplest and fastest ways to establish peace between the parties. | |||||
| 11 | Removal of all restrictions affecting the Russian Orthodox Church. | Once peace is established all restrictions on the ROC imposed due to the war and the martial law will need to be removed. | |||||
| 12 | Step by step resumption of diplomatic and economic relations (including gas transit), transport and other communications, including with third parties. | Once peace is established, the relations between the parties need to be normalised for the mutual benefit. | |||||
Although the Russian Federation presented to Ukraine its Memorandum, Ukraine rejected it summarily by calling it "capitulation" without dealing with each of the Russian demands and showing why these demands are invalid. Had Ukraine done so, it would have helped to the parties understand their positions, rather than calling for negotiations but refusing to consider the issues between the parties.
By dealing with each of the demands presented by Russia and providing clear and valid reasons for their acceptance Ukraine will establish the righteousness of its own demands to Russia. Failure to do so will mean that Ukraine demands have no substance and would validate the Russian demands.
The above table is provided as an example. It is suggested that Ukraine consider the Russian demands with due care and attention and provide Russia with detailed response to each of its demands as in this sample table.